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VALUING LIFE: A PLEA FOR 
DISAGGREGATION 
CASS R. SUNSTEIN† 
ABSTRACT 
Each government agency uses a uniform figure to measure the 
value of a statistical life (VSL). This is a serious mistake. The very 
theory that underlies current practice calls for far more individuation 
of the relevant values. According to that theory, VSL should vary 
across risks. More controversially, VSL should vary across 
individuals—even or especially if the result would be to produce a 
lower number for some people than for others. One practical 
implication is that a higher value should be given to programs that 
reduce cancer risks. Another is that government should use a higher 
VSL for programs that disproportionately benefit the wealthy—and a 
lower VSL for programs that disproportionately benefit the poor. But 
there are two serious complications here. First, bounded rationality 
raises problems for the use of private willingness to pay, which 
underlies current calculations of VSL. Second, the beneficiaries of 
regulation sometimes pay only a fraction or even none of its cost; 
when this is so, the appropriate VSL for poor people might be higher, 
on distributional grounds, than market evidence suggests. An 
understanding of this point has implications for foundational issues 
about government regulation, including valuation of persons in poor 
and wealthy nations. 
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INTRODUCTION 
For over two decades, executive orders have required regulatory 
agencies to engage in cost-benefit analysis of major regulations,1 and 
Congress has imposed similar requirements in several statutes.2 To 
 
 1. See STEPHEN BREYER ET AL., ADMINISTRATIVE LAW AND REGULATORY POLICY 
120–35 (5th ed. 2002) (examining executive orders that require federal agencies to balance the 
benefits of their decisions against the cost). 
 2. See, e.g., Federal Insecticide, Fungicide, and Rodenticide Act, 7 U.S.C. § 136(bb) 
(2000) (defining “unreasonable adverse effects on the environment” as “any unreasonable risk 
to man or the environment, taking into account the economic, social, and environmental costs 
and benefits of the use of any pesticides”); Toxic Substances Control Act, 15 U.S.C. § 2605(c)(1) 
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conduct cost-benefit analysis, agencies must assign monetary values 
to human lives that are potentially saved by a proposed regulation. 
How do they come up with the numbers that they use? Do some 
deaths count for more than others? 
The Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) uses a uniform 
value for a statistical life (VSL): $6.1 million.3 Other agencies use 
numbers that are both higher and lower than the EPA’s VSL, with a 
range, in recent years, between $1.5 million (the Federal Aviation 
Administration (FAA) in 19904) and the Food and Drug 
Administration’s (FDA’s) current figure of $6.5 million.5 Although 
substantial differences can be found across agencies,6 uniformity is the 
intended practice within each agency.7 No agency treats cancer risks, 
 
(2000) (mandating that the administrator consider and publish a statement documenting the 
effects, benefits, and economic impacts of proposed toxic substance regulations); Safe Drinking 
Water Act, 42 U.S.C. § 300g-1(b)(3)(c) (2000) (requiring the documentation of quantifiable and 
nonquantifiable costs and benefits in the establishment of maximum contaminant levels).  
 3. National Primary Drinking Water Regulations; Arsenic and Clarifications to 
Compliance and New Source Contaminants Monitoring, 66 Fed. Reg. 6976, 7012 (Jan. 22, 2001) 
(codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 141, and 142). I refer throughout to uniform numbers, but this is of 
course a simplification. There are differences across agencies, and within agencies practices are 
variable over time and across regulations. By referring to a uniform number, I mean that 
regulatory agencies do not distinguish among risks or among protected classes, so as to produce 
the variations that I emphasize here. Within regulations, uniform numbers are used, and when 
disparate numbers are used across regulations, it is not because of a judgment about different 
risks or different protected classes. 
  In its July 2003 regulation governing food labeling of trans-fatty acids, the Food and 
Drug Administration used a VSL of $6.5 million. Food Labeling: Trans Fatty Acids in Nutrition 
Labeling, Nutrient Content Claims, and Health Claims, 68 Fed. Reg. 41,434, 41,489 (July 11, 
2003) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 101). In its March 2003 proposed rule on dietary ingredients and 
dietary supplements, the same agency suggested a VSL of $5 million. See Current Good 
Manufacturing Practice in Manufacturing, Packing, or Holding Dietary Ingredients and Dietary 
Supplements, 68 Fed. Reg. 12,158, 12,229 (proposed Mar. 13, 2003) (to be codified at 21 C.F.R. 
pts. 111, 112) (using this value to calculate the “value of a statistical life day”). 
 4. The Department of Transportation now uses a higher figure, but one that is still lower 
than the VSL used by most agencies. See Brake System Safety Standards for Freight and Other 
Non-Passenger Trains and Equipment; End-of-Train Devices, 67 Fed. Reg. 17,556, 17,560 (Apr. 
10, 2002) (codified at 49 C.F.R. pt. 232) (recording the Department of Transportation’s VSL as 
$2.7 million).  
 5. Infra Table 1; see Matthew D. Adler & Eric A. Posner, Implementing Cost-Benefit 
Analysis When Preferences Are Distorted, 29 J. LEGAL STUD. 1105, 1146 (2000) (comparing the 
“valuations of life” advanced by multiple agencies).  
 6. These differences seem inexplicable. 
 7. See Adler & Posner, supra note 5, at 1122–23 (explaining that an agency’s use of “a 
constant figure for the monetized value of life” is one means of correcting for wealth distortions 
in individual preferences). There are some differences within agencies across contexts and 
across time, but those differences do not seem deliberate. See supra note 3 (comparing VSLs 
both within and across agencies). The most explicit discussions of varying VSLs have come from 
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or other mortality risks that produce unusual fear or involve special 
suffering, as worthy of more concern (and a higher valuation) than 
other risks. No agency contends that distinctive values should be 
assigned to the risks associated with airplane deaths, motor vehicle 
deaths, or deaths from defective children’s toys. No agency treats 
young people as worth more than old people.8 No agency values the 
lives of poor people less than the lives of rich people. No agency 
distinguishes between whites and African Americans or between men 
and women. For statistical lives, the governing idea is that each life is 
 
the EPA. In its 2003 discussion of hazardous air pollutants, National Emission Standards for 
Hazardous Air Pollutants for Industrial/Commercial/Institutional Boilers and Process Heaters, 
68 Fed. Reg. 1660 (proposed Jan. 13, 2003) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 63), the EPA noted: 
There is general agreement that the value to an individual of a reduction in mortality 
risk can vary based on several factors, including the age of the individual, the type of 
risk, the level of control the individual has over the risk, the individual’s attitude 
toward risk, and the health status of the individual. 
Id. at 1695. Nonetheless, the agency announced, without explanation, that it “prefers not to 
draw distinctions in the monetary value assigned to the lives saved even if they differ in age, 
health status, socioeconomic status, gender or other characteristic of the adult population.” Id. 
An extended discussion of related issues can be found in the EPA’s arsenic proposal, 
National Primary Drinking Water Regulations; Arsenic and Clarifications to Compliance and 
New Source Contaminants Monitoring, 65 Fed. Reg. 38,888 (proposed June 22, 2000) (to be 
codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 141, 142). In this proposal, the EPA noted that the  
factors which may influence the estimate of economic benefits associated with 
avoided cancer fatalities include (1) a possible ‘cancer premium’ (i.e., the additional 
value or sum that people may be willing to pay to avoid the experiences of dread, 
pain and suffering, and diminished quality of life associated with cancer-related illness 
and ultimate fatality); (2) the willingness of people to pay more over time to avoid 
mortality risk as their income rises; (3) a possible premium for accepting involuntary 
risks as opposed to voluntary [sic] assumed risks; (4) the greater risk aversion of the 
general population as compared to workers in the wage-risk valuation studies; (5) 
‘altruism’ or the willingness of people to pay more to reduce risk in other sectors of 
the population; and (6) a consideration of health status and life years remaining at the 
time of premature mortality. 
Id. at 38,945. The EPA acknowledged that these factors “may significantly increase the present 
value estimate,” but said that “there is currently neither a clear consensus among economists 
about how to simultaneously analyze each of these adjustments nor is there adequate empirical 
data to support definitive quantitative estimates for all potentially significant adjustment 
factors.” Id. Hence the EPA solicited comments on these issues and said that it would ask its 
Scientific Advisory Board (SAB) to conduct a review. Id. As noted below, the comments 
produced a sensitivity analysis that contains several upward adjustments from the $6.1 million 
figure, see infra note 100 and accompanying text, but the SAB’s review suggested that at the 
present time, upward adjustments were not justified by existing evidence, see infra note 141 and 
accompanying text. 
 8. With the interest in focusing on “life-years,” however, this might change. See Cass R. 
Sunstein, Lives, Life-Years, and Willingness to Pay, 104 COLUM. L. REV. 205, 206 (2004) 
(“[G]overnment should consider not simply . . . the VSL; it should concern itself also or instead 
with the number of life-years at stake, or the value of statistical life-years (VSLY). At the very 
least, the number of statistical life-years is a more precise measure of what is involved.”).  
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worth exactly the same. With respect to cost-benefit analysis, much is 
disputed.9 But on the idea of a uniform value per life saved, there is a 
solid consensus, at least in terms of regulatory practice.10 
The stakes are exceedingly high. If cost-benefit analysis is the 
basis for the ultimate decision to approve or reject a proposed 
regulation, everything turns on the selected VSL. If an agency uses a 
VSL of, say, $15 million, many more regulations will be justified than 
if it uses a VSL of, say, $2 million. And if a uniform number is 
rejected, the pattern of justified regulations will shift dramatically. 
Some existing regulations will be revealed as too weak, and more 
stringency will be required; others will seem too aggressive and will 
have to be weakened or even eliminated. If agencies shifted to using 
VSLs that varied along one or more variables, the regulatory system 
would look very different from how it does today. 
In this Article, I intend to question the consensus in favor of a 
uniform VSL, and to do so in a way that raises foundational issues 
about the economic valuation of human lives. I suggest that a uniform 
value is obtuse. Under the very approach that agencies use to produce 
the current numbers, VSL should vary along two dimensions. VSL is 
calculated based on people’s willingness to pay (WTP) to avoid 
particular risks, and if WTP is particularly high, VSL will be high as 
well. For two reasons, VSL should be expected to be highly variable, 
in a way that makes a uniform number senseless.  
 
 9. See generally FRANK ACKERMAN & LISA HEINZERLING, PRICELESS: ON KNOWING 
THE PRICE OF EVERYTHING AND THE VALUE OF NOTHING (2004) (attacking the very practice 
of assigning dollar values to lives and health as part of cost-benefit analysis); W. KIP VISCUSI, 
FATAL TRADEOFFS: PUBLIC AND PRIVATE RESPONSIBILITIES FOR RISK (1992) (suggesting that 
the government should “respect citizens’ preferences” in assigning valuation and thus should 
consider subjective valuation in cost-benefit analysis, even when such valuation is irrational); 
Adler & Posner, supra note 5, at 1106 (“The problem with the traditional definition of [cost-
benefit analysis] in terms of actual preferences is that satisfaction of actual preference and 
maximization of well-being are not equivalent. . . . Cost-benefit analysis can be redefined as the 
sum of welfare equivalents . . . .”).  
 10. An arguable exception, noted above, involves the debate over whether agencies should 
focus on lives or instead life-years; the latter approach might well value older people less than 
younger ones. For discussion, see Sunstein, supra note 8, at 205. Professor W. Kip Viscusi 
implicitly challenges the consensus, stating: “The current approach of ignoring length-of-life 
issues creates inequities by valuing the life of a person with . . . a 6-month life expectancy the 
same as a . . . person with a 40-year life expectancy.” W. Kip Viscusi, Risk Equity, 29 J. LEGAL 
STUD. 843, 870 (2000). W. Kip Viscusi and Joseph E. Aldy note the existence of heterogeneity 
by income, union status, and age, and they explain that the “existence of such heterogeneity 
provides a cautionary note for policy.” W. Kip Viscusi & Joseph E. Aldy, The Value of a 
Statistical Life: A Critical Review of Market Estimates Throughout the World, 27 J. RISK & 
UNCERTAINTY 5, 7 (2003). 
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First, VSL should vary across risks. For example, people are 
willing to pay high amounts to avoid cancer risks, and hence there is 
reason to think that people’s VSL is higher for cancer deaths than for 
sudden, unanticipated deaths.11 Cancer risks are involved in the work 
of many regulatory agencies, and people seem to be particularly 
concerned about such risks, in a way that should produce a high 
VSL—almost unquestionably higher than the values that agencies 
now use. More generally, deaths that produce unusual fear,12 or that 
are accompanied by high levels of pain and suffering, should be 
expected to produce a higher VSL. Human beings face countless 
mortality risks, and it would be truly bizarre to maintain that people 
value avoiding each of those risks identically. 
Second, VSL should vary across individuals, simply because 
different people are willing to pay different amounts to avoid risks.13 
People who are risk averse will be willing to pay more, and will 
therefore show a higher VSL, than people who are risk-seeking.14 
Those who are rich will show a higher VSL than those who are poor. 
People who are thirty might well show a higher VSL than people who 
are sixty.15 It follows that different demographic groups will show 
diversity in their VSLs as well.16 
 
 11. See James K. Hammitt & Jin-Tan Liu, Effects of Disease Type and Latency on the Value 
of Mortality Risk, 28 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 73, 80 (2004) (“The value of preventing a fatal 
cancer is often considered to be greater than the value of preventing a fatal trauma in a 
workplace or transportation accident.”). 
 12. For evidence of a higher VSL for airline risks than for automotive risks, see Fredrik 
Carlsson et al., Is Transport Safety More Valuable in the Air?, 28 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 147, 
148 (2004) (“There are several reasons why individuals would be willing to pay more for the 
same risk reduction when traveling by air compared to by other transport modes, such as car or 
train.”). 
 13. See Viscusi & Aldy, supra note 10, at 18 (“[T]ransferring the estimates of a value of a 
statistical life to non-labor market contexts, as is the case in benefit-cost analyses of 
environmental health policies for example, should recognize that different populations have 
different preferences over risks and different values on life-saving.”). 
 14. See Carlsson et al., supra note 12, at 158 (finding that people who are scared of flying 
are willing to pay especially high amounts to reduce the risks associated with flying). 
 15. See JOSEPH E. ALDY & W. KIP VISCUSI, AGE VARIATIONS IN WORKERS’ VALUE OF 
STATISTICAL LIFE 1 (Nat’l Bureau of Econ. Research, Working Paper No. 10199, 2003) (“[O]ne 
might expect that older individuals may value reducing risks to their lives less because they have 
shorter remaining life expectancy.”).  
 16. Such differences are found in W. Kip Viscusi, Racial Differences in Labor Market 
Values of a Statistical Life, 27 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 239, 252 tbl.5 (2003). To get a bit ahead 
of the story: I am not arguing that government should assign a higher VSL to white lives than to 
African-American lives. I am speaking here of demographic differences that would emerge 
from a fully individuated approach to VSL, in which each person’s WTP was calculated on an 
individual basis. Once these values are aggregated, the white VSL would likely be higher than 
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If these two forms of variability—across risks and across 
persons—are put together, it will be clear that the unitary $6.1 million 
figure used by the EPA is far too crude.17 Each person in society is 
willing to pay a distinctive amount to avoid each risk. It follows that 
in theory, each person should have a particular VSL for each and 
every risk, resulting in a fully individuated VSL.18 Such a fully 
individuated VSL would mean, for example, that agencies would 
value avoidance of cancer risks more highly than many other 
mortality risks—and that the VSL of some racial groups would likely 
be lower than that of others.19 But the latter differences would not be 
the result of a governmental decision to take racial characteristics into 
account; in fact it would not be a product of any kind of group-level 
discrimination on the government’s part.20 The differences would be 
the result of aggregating the VSLs calculated for each individual. 
 
the African-American VSL, simply because of disparities in wealth and income. Richer people 
pay more for safe cars and smoke alarms than poor people do. See infra text accompanying 
notes 17–21.  
 17. I use the EPA’s $6.1 million VSL throughout as a convenient example of a unitary 
figure, but the analysis applies equally to any agency’s unitary figure, and to uniformity across 
agencies. 
 18. I am putting to one side the complication that values sometimes are constructed, rather 
than elicited, by social situations—an especially serious complication for contingent valuation 
studies. See John W. Payne et al., Measuring Constructed Preferences: Toward a Building Code, 
19 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 243, 244 (1999) (addressing the “alternate viewpoint . . . that 
preferences are generally constructed—not revealed—at the time a valuation question is 
asked”); Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 
70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159, 1177–78 (2003) (“[I]n the contexts in which [contingent valuation] 
studies are used, . . . it is unclear that people have straightforward ‘values’ that can actually be 
found. Hence some form of paternalism verges on the inevitable: Stated values will often be 
affected . . . by how the questions are set up.” (footnote omitted)). 
 19. See John D. Leeth & John Ruser, Compensating Wage Differentials for Fatal and 
Nonfatal Injury Risk by Gender and Race, 27 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 257, 270 (2003) (finding 
that the implied VSL for Hispanic males is $5.0 million overall and $4.2 million for blue-collar 
workers, whereas the implied VSL for white males is $3.4 million overall and $4.2 million for 
blue-collar workers); Viscusi, supra note 16, at 252 (finding VSLs of $15 million for whites and 
$7.2 million for African Americans, $18.8 million for white males and $9.4 million for white 
females, and $6.9 million for African-American females and $5.9 million for African-American 
males). 
 20. Discrimination might well lay in the background, of course; it almost certainly accounts 
for the unequal opportunities that produce lower VSLs for African Americans than for whites. 
See Viscusi, supra note 16, at 255. Professor Viscusi goes on to suggest that “it is inappropriate 
to attribute the observed differences to a greater willingness by black workers to bear risk.” Id. 
In a sense Professor Viscusi is correct; there is no reason to think that African-American 
workers have an intrinsically greater predisposition to take risks. But in the market, one’s 
willingness to bear risks is a product of “market opportunities,” and hence those with fewer 
opportunities will show a greater willingness to bear risk.  
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Such aggregation occurs today in, for example, ordinary consumer 
markets that price reduction of the statistical risks associated with 
smoke alarms, unusually safe cars, and much more.21  
In practice, of course, a fully individuated VSL is not feasible, for 
two different reasons. First, government lacks the information that 
would permit the calculation. Regulators do not know how much 
each person would be willing to pay to reduce each statistical risk; 
generalizations through the use of categories are therefore inevitable. 
Second, many regulatory programs involve collective goods and 
protect many people at once. A clean air program, for example, 
cannot easily ensure that some people in a geographical region are 
exposed to no more than 10 parts per billion (ppb) of some pollutant, 
while others in the same region are subjected to 50 ppb. Because 
collective goods are typically involved in regulation, the problem is 
pervasive. When government is providing a regulatory good to many 
people at once, feasibility requires that it use a single VSL, not a 
range of VSLs. 
Notwithstanding issues of feasibility, an understanding of the 
reasons for individuating VSL is important for two reasons. The first 
involves conceptual clarity. The theory behind the use of VSL and 
WTP remains poorly understood. In brief, VSL, as currently 
understood, is a product of agency judgments about people’s WTP to 
reduce or eliminate certain risks. When a particular VSL is used (say, 
$6 million), it is because the agency estimates that people are willing 
to pay a certain amount to reduce statistical risks of a specified 
magnitude. This point should be enough to show that whatever 
terminology agencies use, there is no “value of a statistical life”; there 
are only values for the reduction of statistical risks.22 Once regulators 
identify the real question as the identification of those values, they 
will find it difficult to defend a unitary VSL, simply because there is 
no such thing. An appreciation of the case for individuation will 
clarify the theory—both its rationale and its limitations, empirical and 
ethical. I emphasize that the theory is undergirded by considerations 
 
 21. See VISCUSI, supra note 9, at 31–32 (discussing the value of life issue in economic 
terms).  
 22. See, e.g., National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for 
Industrial/Commercial/Institutional Boilers and Process Heaters, 68 Fed. Reg. 1660, 1695 
(proposed Jan. 13, 2003) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 63) (noting that the value of a statistical 
life is “the value to an individual of a reduction in mortality risk”). 
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of both autonomy and welfare—and that those considerations also 
show when the use of WTP to calculate VSL is misguided. 
The second reason involves the possibility of moving a long way 
toward greater individuation, even if full individuation is not feasible. 
With respect to the reduction of cancer risks, for example, there is 
reason to believe that people are willing to pay an extra amount; 
hence VSL, based on WTP, is significantly higher than studies of risks 
not involving cancer suggest.23 For this reason, the government’s 
current valuation of cancer risks is probably too low, resulting in 
widespread underprotection of the public. Similarly, there is reason to 
think that VSL should be higher for mortality risks from airplanes 
than for statistically identical risks on the highways.24 More generally, 
different agencies, dealing with qualitatively different risks, might 
well use different VSLs, simply because market evidence is likely to 
show just those differences.25 Full individuation is not feasible, but 
greater individuation would be quite easy. The result would be 
different judgments from agencies, simply because new VSLs—some 
higher, others lower—would produce different conclusions about 
when regulation is justified. 
A far more troublesome problem, to which I will devote 
considerable attention, involves disparities along demographic lines. 
For now, notice a simple factual point: WTP is dependent on ability 
to pay, and those with little income and wealth will show little WTP.26 
It follows that the VSL of poor people, when calculated based on 
WTP, will be lower than the VSL of rich people, simply because poor 
people are poorer. Suppose that the $6.1 million figure used by the 
EPA represents the average WTP of a population-wide sample. 
When risks are faced disproportionately by wealthy people, VSL, 
 
 23. See supra note 11 and accompanying text.  
 24. See Carlsson, supra note 12, at 148 (finding that individuals’ WTP to reduce the risk of 
airline deaths is more than double their WTP to reduce the risk of taxi deaths).  
 25. As I explain in Part I.A, different agencies now use different numbers for VSL, but 
these differences seem random and do not stem from a careful inquiry into the questions that I 
am emphasizing here. 
 26. If the tax laws ensured the right level of redistribution, there would be little reason to 
use regulatory policy to promote redistributive goals. Regulation would be based on WTP, and 
tax laws would ensure such redistribution. Hence the analysis of VSL and WTP would be 
different with an optimal tax policy from what it must be without such a policy. If tax policy 
were optimal, a highly variable WTP would be appropriate and there would be no need to take 
account of distributional concerns. The discussion below is based on the assumption that more 
redistribution is desirable and that regulatory policy can sometimes help to promote that goal, 
though less effectively than an optimal tax. 
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based on actual WTP, should be higher than $6.1 million—just as it 
should be lower when the regulated risks are faced disproportionately 
by poor people.27 It is inevitable that people in poor nations will have 
a lower VSL than people in rich nations, a point with implications for 
valuation of the harms from global warming.28 Similarly, people in 
poor areas will have a lower VSL than those in wealthy areas, a point 
with implications for valuation of a variety of risks in the domestic 
setting. If variations across risks and persons are significant, the 
question of individuation should be a central part of the second 
generation of cost-benefit analysis—a step beyond the first-
generation debate about whether to do such analysis at all, and a step 
toward doing such analysis in a way that is more refined and more 
closely attuned to the consequences of regulations in terms of choice, 
welfare, and distributional equity. 
Of course it is offensive and wrong to suggest that in principle, 
poor people are “worth less” than rich people. If poor people are 
subject to a risk of 1/10,000, they do not have less of a claim to public 
attention than wealthy people who are subject to the same risk; in fact 
they may have a greater claim, if only because they lack the resources 
to reduce that risk on their own. But the topic here is regulation 
rather than subsidy, and the two ought not to be confused. In 
principle, government should not force people to buy protection 
against statistical risks at a price that seems excessive to them.29 At 
least as a general rule, people should not be required to pay $70 to 
reduce a risk of 1/100,000 if they are willing to pay no more than $50.  
If a uniform VSL would benefit the poor, there is a strong 
argument for a uniform VSL. But regulation based on a uniform VSL 
may or may not produce a more equitable distribution of income; in 
fact any redistribution may be perverse, and a single VSL might not 
promote equality at all.30 And if poor people are forced to pay an 
amount for risk reduction that exceeds their WTP, desirable 
redistribution will hardly result; forced exchanges, on terms that 
people would voluntarily reject, are not a good way of redistributing 
 
 27. With this qualification: If poor people would be disproportionately benefited by 
assigning them a higher VSL, then there is a good argument for assigning them a higher VSL. I 
explore this issue in Part III.B. 
 28. See infra Part IV. 
 29. I offer a number of qualifications below. See infra Part III.B. 
 30. If wealthy people are the principal beneficiaries of a particular regulation chosen on the 
basis of a uniform VSL, and if the public as a whole pays for it, then any redistribution will 
benefit the wealthy, not the poor. 
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wealth to the disadvantaged. (Requiring poor people to buy Volvos is 
not the most sensible means of assisting them.) On the other hand, it 
is possible that some regulatory programs, based on a uniform VSL, 
will help those in need, if their beneficiaries receive risk reduction for 
which they pay little or nothing—an issue to which I will devote 
considerable attention. 
A larger lesson follows from this discussion. For purposes of law 
and politics, there is no sensible answer to the abstract question about 
the correct monetary value of human life. Any judgment about the 
appropriate VSL, and about individuation, must be heavily 
pragmatic; it must rest on the consequences of one or another choice. 
Whether government should use a higher or lower VSL across 
demographic lines cannot be answered simply. An important 
implication involves the assessment of VSL across nations. A poor 
nation would do well to adopt a lower VSL than a wealthy nation; for 
China or India, it would be disastrous to use a VSL equivalent to that 
of the United States or Canada. But this point should not be taken to 
support the ludicrous proposition that donor institutions, both public 
and private, should value risk reduction in a wealthy nation above 
equivalent risk reduction in a poor nation. 
This Article is organized as follows. Part I clarifies the theory 
behind the valuation of statistical lives. The major point is that 
regulators do not really use a VSL; instead they use a mean WTP to 
eliminate a statistical risk. For example, agencies might say that they 
are using a VSL of $6 million, but when they do so, they are relying on 
evidence more or less establishing that the average person is paid 
$600 to face a risk of 1/10,000. The case for using this evidence 
depends on considerations of both autonomy and welfare. Part II, in 
some ways the heart of the Article, explores the need for 
individuation across both risks and persons. Part III offers a more 
ambitious discussion of the uses and limits of WTP in regulatory 
policy. It distinguishes between easy and hard cases for using WTP to 
calculate VSL. The central claim in Part III is that the argument for 
using WTP is strongest when the beneficiaries of regulation must pay 
all of its cost—though even in that event, the argument is subject to 
important qualifications, above all involving bounded rationality. The 
argument for using WTP is weaker when the beneficiaries of 
regulation pay only a fraction of that cost. When this is so, some 
people will benefit from regulation even if it is inefficient in economic 
terms. I discuss the implications of this point for a uniform or fully 
individuated VSL. Part IV turns to global regulation and the question 
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of cross-national differences in VSL. My conclusion is that while third-
party donors should help those people who need help most, without 
reference to lower VSLs in poor countries, governments in wealthy 
nations should use a higher VSL than governments in poor ones. 
I.  WTP: THEORY AND PRACTICE 
I begin with an explanation of existing agency practice in 
calculating VSL and of the theory that underlies it. As discussed 
below, agencies calculate VSL on the basis of market evidence of 
WTP. Agencies are not really able to identify a “value of a statistical 
life”; instead they take advantage of information about how much 
people are willing to pay for facing statistical risks. I suggest that 
considerations of both welfare and autonomy make it reasonable for 
agencies to consult WTP. Unfortunately, many questions might be 
raised about the numbers that agencies now use.  
A. Agency Practice 
It has now become standard for regulatory agencies to assign 
monetary values to human lives. Consider the following table, which 
captures several examples of agency practices from 1996 through 2003: 
TABLE 1: AGENCY VALUES OF LIFE, 1996–2003 
Agency Regulation and Date VSL (in US$) 
Department of 
Transportation/Federal 
Motor Carrier Safety 
Administration 
Safety Requirements for Operators of 
Small Passenger-Carrying Commercial 
Motor Vehicles Used in Interstate 
Commerce (Aug. 12, 2003)
 31
 
3 million 
Department of Health 
& Human Services/FDA 
Food Labeling: Trans Fatty Acids in 
Nutrition Labeling, Nutrient Content 
Claims, and Health Claims (July 11, 2003)
 32
6.5 million 
Department of 
Agriculture/Food Safety 
and Inspection Service 
Control of Listeria Monocytogenes in 
Ready-to-Eat Meat and Poultry Products 
(June 6, 2003)
 33
 
4.8 million 
Department of Health 
& Human Services/FDA 
Labeling Requirements for Systemic 
Antibacterial Drug Products Intended for 
Human Use (Feb. 6, 2003)
34
 
5 million 
 
 31. 68 Fed. Reg. 47,860, 47,869 (Aug. 12, 2003) (codified at 49 C.F.R. pts. 390, 398). 
 32. 68 Fed. Reg. 41,434, 41,490 (July 11, 2003) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 101). 
 33. 68 Fed. Reg. 34,208, 34,222 (June 6, 2003) (codified at 9 C.F.R. pt. 430). 
 34. 68 Fed. Reg. 6062, 6076 (Feb. 6, 2003) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 201). 
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Office of Management 
and Budget 
Draft 2003 Report to Congress on the 
Costs and Benefits of Federal Regulations 
(Feb. 3, 2003)
35
 
5 million 
EPA Control of Emissions from Nonroad Large 
Spark-Ignition Engines, and Recreational 
Engines (Marine and Land-Based) (Nov. 8, 
2002)
36
 
6 million 
EPA National Primary Drinking Water 
Regulations; Arsenic and Clarifications to 
Compliance and New Source Contaminants 
Monitoring (Jan. 22, 2001)
37
 
6.1 million 
EPA Control of Air Pollution from New Motor 
Vehicles: Heavy-Duty Engine and Vehicle 
Standards and Highway Diesel Fuel Sulfur 
Control Requirements (Jan. 18, 2001)
38
 
6 million 
EPA Control of Air Pollution from New Motor 
Vehicles: Tier 2 Motor Vehicle Emissions 
Standards and Gasoline Sulfur Control 
Requirements (Feb. 10, 2000)
39
 
5.9 million 
EPA Findings of Significant Contribution and 
Rulemaking on Section 126 Petitions for 
Purposes of Reducing Interstate Ozone 
Transport (Jan. 18, 2000)
40
 
5.9 million 
EPA Final Standards for Hazardous Air 
Pollutants for Hazardous Waste 
Combustors (Sept. 30, 1999)
41
 
5.6 million 
EPA National Primary Drinking Water 
Regulations: Disinfectants and Disinfection 
Byproducts (Dec. 16, 1998)
42
 
5.6 million 
 
 35. 68 Fed. Reg. 5492, 5500 (proposed Feb. 3, 2003). 
 36. 67 Fed. Reg. 68,242, 68,327 (Nov. 8, 2002) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 89–91, 94, 1048, 
1051, 1065, and 1068). 
 37. 66 Fed. Reg. 6976, 7012 (Jan. 22, 2001) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 141, and 142). 
 38. 66 Fed. Reg. 5002, 5103 (Jan. 18, 2001) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 69 and 80). 
 39. 65 Fed. Reg. 6698, 6784 (Feb. 10, 2000) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 80, 85, and 86). 
 40. 65 Fed. Reg. 2674, 2721 (Jan. 18, 2000) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 52, 97). 
 41. 64 Fed. Reg. 52,828, 53,020 (Sept. 30, 1999) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 60, et al.). 
 42. 63 Fed. Reg. 69,390, 69,440–41 (Dec. 16, 1998) (codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 141 and 142). 
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Department of 
Transportation/FAA 
Financial Responsibility Requirements for 
Licensed Launch Activities (Aug. 26, 
1998)
43
 
3 million 
Department of Health 
& Human Services/FDA 
Quality Mammography Standards (Oct. 28, 
1997)
44
 
5 million 
Department of Health 
& Human Services/FDA 
Regulations Restricting the Sale and 
Distribution of Cigarettes and Smokeless 
Tobacco to Protect Children and 
Adolescents (Aug. 28, 1996)
45
 
2.5 million 
Department of 
Agriculture/Food Safety 
and Inspection Service 
Pathogen Reduction; Hazard Analysis and 
Critical Control Point (HACCP) Systems 
(July 25, 1996)
46
 
1.6 million 
Department of 
Transportation/FAA 
Aircraft Flight Simulator Use in Pilot 
Training, Testing and Checking and at 
Training Centers (July 2, 1996)
47
  
2.7 million 
Consumer Product 
Safety Commission 
Requirements for Labeling of Retail 
Containers of Charcoal (May 3, 1996)
48
 
5 million 
Consumer Product 
Safety Commission 
Large Multiple-Tube Fireworks Devices 
(May 3, 1996)
49
 
4.5–8 million 
These numbers show substantial variations, though less so than 
even ten years ago.50 The variations appear not to have any rationale 
behind them; agencies with higher or lower numbers have not 
explained their choices (and this is a significant problem). But the 
most fundamental question is how agencies generate monetary 
amounts of this kind. Agencies rely on two kinds of evidence. The 
first and most important involves real-world markets, producing 
 
 43. 63 Fed. Reg. 45,592, 45,604 (Aug. 26, 1998) (codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 440). 
 44. 62 Fed. Reg. 55,852, 55,964 (Oct. 28, 1997) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 16, 900). 
 45. 61 Fed. Reg. 44,396, 44,576 (Aug. 28, 1996) (codified at 21 C.F.R. pts. 803, 807,  
and 820). 
 46. 61 Fed. Reg. 38,806, 38,958 (July 25, 1996) (codified at 9 C.F.R. pts. 310, 327, 381, 416, 
and 417). 
 47. 61 Fed. Reg. 34,508, 34,546 (July 2, 1996) (codified at 14 C.F.R. pt. 1). 
 48. 61 Fed. Reg. 19,818, 19,825 (May 3, 1996) (codified at 16 C.F.R. pt. 1500). 
 49. 61 Fed. Reg. 13,084, 13,094 (Mar. 26, 1996) (codified at 16 C.F.R. pts. 1500, 1507). 
 50. See Adler & Posner, supra note 5, at 1146 (showing an ever larger disparity in VSL 
numbers used by agencies between 1988 and 1997). 
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evidence of compensation levels for actual risks.51 In the workplace 
and in the market for consumer goods, additional safety has a price; 
market evidence is investigated to identify that price.52 The second 
kind of evidence comes from contingent valuation studies, which ask 
people how much they are willing to pay to reduce statistical risks.53 
The EPA’s $6.1 million figure, for example, is a product of studies of 
actual workplace risks; such studies attempt to determine how much 
workers are paid to assume mortality hazards.54 The relevant risks 
usually are in the general range of 1/10,000 to 1/100,000.55 The 
calculation of VSL is a product of simple arithmetic. Suppose that 
workers must be paid $600, on average, to assume a risk of 1/10,000. 
If so, the VSL would be said to be $6 million. 
For some of the two dozen labor market studies on which 
agencies currently rely,56 consider the following table:57 
TABLE 2: LABOR MARKET STUDIES ON THE VALUE OF LIFE 
Study VSL (in US$)  
Kniesner and Leith (1991) .7 million 
Smith and Gilbert (1984) .8 million 
Dillingham (1985) 1.1 million 
Marin and Psacharopoulos (1982) 3.4 million 
V.K. Smith (1976) 5.7 million 
Viscusi (1981) 7.9 million 
Leigh and Folsom (1984) 11.7 million 
Leigh (1987) 12.6 million 
Garen (1988) 16.3 million 
 
 51. See VISCUSI, supra note 9, at 35 (explaining how labor markets compensate workers for 
taking on risk). 
 52. See generally Viscusi & Aldy, supra note 10 (providing a valuable and comprehensive 
overview of how market evidence is used to set prices). 
 53. See, e.g., Hammitt & Liu, supra note 11, at 74 (using contingent valuation in a study of 
WTP in the context of cancer and other degenerative diseases). 
 54. Cass R. Sunstein, The Arithmetic of Arsenic, 90 GEO. L.J. 2255, 2274 (2002); VISCUSI, 
supra note 9 (discussing WTP studies and how agencies use them to calculate VSL). 
 55. See, e.g., W. Kip Viscusi, The Value of Life: Estimates with Risks by Occupation and 
Industry, 42 ECON. INQUIRY 29, 33 (2004) (showing fatality risks ranging from about 1/100,000 
to 45/100,000). 
 56. See Richard W. Parker, Grading the Government, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1345, 1485–86 
(2003) (providing an accessible outline of labor market studies). 
 57. ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, GUIDELINES FOR PREPARING ECONOMIC ANALYSES 89 
(2000). 
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A large advantage of labor market studies of this kind is that 
they avoid the lively disputes over the use of “willingness to pay” or 
“willingness to accept” (WTA) in regulatory policy.58 In many 
contexts, in both experiments and the real world, people demand 
more to give up a good than they are willing to pay to obtain it in the 
first instance—a disparity that significantly complicates efforts to 
assign monetary values to regulatory benefits, including mortality and 
morbidity.59 If people are willing to pay $25 to eliminate an existing 
risk of 1/100,000, but demand $100 to incur a new risk of 1/100,000, 
then it is difficult to know how to proceed for purposes of monetary 
valuation of risks. Should agencies use $25, $100, or some 
intermediate figure? Fortunately, this problem dissipates in the 
context of labor market studies. If workers who face a risk of 1/10,000 
are paid $600 more for doing so, and if workers who refuse to face 
such a risk are paid $600 less, then it is irrelevant whether agencies 
speak in terms of WTP or WTA. 
B. Of Welfare and Autonomy 
Why do regulators care about market valuations of statistical 
risks? There are two possible answers. The first and more 
conventional involves welfare. The second and perhaps more 
interesting involves autonomy. 
In economic terms, these valuations provide a clue to the welfare 
consequences, for individuals, of one or another outcome. If people 
are willing to pay $60, but no more, to eliminate a risk of 1/100,000, 
then it can be reasonably assumed that their welfare is increased by 
asking them to pay that amount—and that their welfare is decreased 
by asking them to pay more. There are many demands on people’s 
budgets, and if they prefer not to spend more than $60 to eliminate a 
risk of 1/100,000, it may be because they would like to use their 
money for food, shelter, recreation, education, or any number of 
other goods. With respect to mortality risks, it is possible that people 
 
 58. See generally Russell Korobkin, The Endowment Effect and Legal Analysis, 97 NW. U. 
L. REV. 1227 (2003) (explaining the so-called “endowment effect,” by which individuals often 
demand more to relinquish an item (WTA) than they would pay to obtain that same item 
(WTP)). 
 59. See id. at 1228 (“[P]eople will often demand a higher price to sell a good that they 
possess than they would pay for the same good if they did not possess it at present.” (footnote 
omitted)); Cass R. Sunstein, Endogenous Preferences, Environmental Law, 22 J. LEGAL STUD. 
217, 226–27 (1993) (“The range of the disparity appears to vary from slight amounts to a ratio of 
more than four to one, with WTA usually doubling WTP.”).  
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are sometimes inadequately informed, and there might be reason to 
override their judgments. But so long as information is available, the 
welfare argument is straightforward.60 
Perhaps regulatory policy should not be based on welfare; 
perhaps it is unclear what “welfare” really means, and WTP might be 
defended instead on the ground of personal autonomy.61 On this view, 
people should be sovereign over their own lives, and government 
should respect personal choices about how to use limited resources 
(again so long as those choices are informed). When people decline to 
devote more than $60 to the elimination of a 1/100,000 risk, it is 
because they would prefer to spend the money in a way that seems to 
them more desirable. If regulators do not use people’s actual 
judgments, then they are insulting their dignity. The use of WTP 
therefore can claim a simultaneous defense from both utilitarian and 
deontological accounts. 
C. Questions and Doubts 
Nonetheless, some questions might be raised about the use of the 
relevant studies by the EPA and other agencies.62 Most obviously, the 
studies show significant variety in the crucial numbers, ranging from 
$16.3 million in 1988 to $.7 million in 1991. The EPA has adopted the 
$6.1 million figure on the ground that it represents the median in the 
relevant studies.63 But there is a risk of arbitrariness in fastening on 
that median figure, particularly if there is no reason to believe that 
the relevant study is the most accurate. In fact a more general look at 
the VSL data produces further puzzles and wider ranges. Some 
studies find no compensating differentials at all, indicating a VSL of 
zero64—implausibly low, to say the least, for purposes of policy. 
Others find that nonunionized workers receive negative compensating 
differentials for risk—that is, they appear to be paid less because they 
 
 60. I deal with some complexities in Part III. 
 61. See RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VIRTUE: THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF 
EQUALITY 122 (2000) (arguing that liberty “is essential to any process in which equality is 
defined and secured”).  
 62. For several such questions, see Robert H. Frank & Cass R. Sunstein, Cost-Benefit 
Analysis and Relative Position, 68 U. CHI. L. REV. 323, 323–28 (2001), and Parker, supra note 
56, at 1348–57. 
 63. See supra note 54 and accompanying text. 
 64. See Peter Dorman & Paul Hagstrom, Wage Compensation for Dangerous Work 
Revisited, 52 INDUS. & LAB. REL. REV. 116, 133 (1998) (finding “statistically significant positive 
compensation” for only a few categories of workers).  
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face mortality risks.65 Another study finds that African Americans 
receive no significant compensating wage differential and hence that 
their particular VSL is zero.66 On the other hand, some studies find 
VSLs actually above the VSLs presented in Table 1; consider the 
finding that for people who choose jobs with low level risks, the VSL 
is as much as $22 million.67 
The most recent metastudy, far more comprehensive than the 
EPA’s own analysis, finds that most studies produce VSLs ranging 
from $3.8 million to $9 million.68 The range is fairly compressed, in a 
way that disciplines agency decisions; for many regulations, the 
“bottom line” of the cost-benefit assessment will not be affected by a 
choice of $3.8 million or $9 million. But that range still leaves 
significant room for discretion, in a way that would have significant 
implications for policy and law. Consider the fact that the monetized 
value of a program that saves two hundred lives would range from 
$760 million to $1.8 billion; note also that the EPA’s highly publicized 
arsenic regulation would easily fail cost-benefit analysis with a $3.8 
million VSL but easily pass with a $9 million VSL.69 The simple point 
is that the variety of the outcomes raises questions about the 
reliability of any particular figure. 
In addition, most of the studies on which the EPA relies are 
based on data from the 1970s.70 Since that time, there has been 
significant growth in national income.71 This change suggests that any 
VSL derived from 1970s data is too low. Of course people with more 
money are expected to be willing to pay more, other things being 
equal, to reduce statistical risks. One study finds that at the beginning 
of the twentieth century, VSL was about $150,000 in current dollars—
less than one-twentieth of the corresponding amount a century later.72 
On reasonable assumptions, the EPA’s use of 1970s data has 
 
 65. Viscusi & Aldy, supra note 10, at 44. 
 66. Leeth & Ruser, supra note 19, at 270. 
 67. Viscusi & Aldy, supra note 10, at 23. 
 68. Id. at 18. 
 69. See Sunstein, supra note 54, at 2274–76 (discussing the EPA’s use of a $6.1 million VSL 
in evaluating the arsenic regulation). The regulation was projected to cost about $200 million, 
and its monetized benefits, with a $6.1 million VSL, were around $190 million. Id. at 2275. It 
should be easy to see that a $3.8 million VSL would make the regulation impossible to defend—
and a $9 million VSL would make it impossible to challenge. 
 70. Id. at 2274. 
 71. Id. at 2284–85. 
 72. Viscusi & Aldy, supra note 10, at 22. 
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produced a significant undervaluation of the monetary value of the 
lives at stake; the $6.1 million figure reflects no adjustment to account 
for changes in national real income growth.73 In principle, the failure 
to undertake an adjustment is a serious mistake. The actual mean 
WTP might be substantially higher.74 
Even more fundamentally, the relevant numbers deserve respect 
only if they do not result from bounded rationality or an absence of 
information on the part of the people whose choices generate them. 
Suppose, for example, that workers do not know the risks that they 
face or that their decisions are products of the availability heuristic or 
optimistic bias.75 In either case, regulators should not use, for 
purposes of policy, a finding that workers are paid $60 to run a risk of 
1/100,000; by hypothesis, that number does not reflect a rational 
tradeoff by informed workers. I return to these points below.76 
Current practice is based on an assumption, not that all or even most 
workers make informed choices, but that market processes ensure the 
right “price” for various degrees of safety.77 Compare pricing for soap, 
cereals, and telephones: most consumers do not have full information 
and use heuristics that lead them astray, but market competition 
produces a sensible structure of prices, at least most of the time. 
 
 73. The EPA has updated the relevant numbers for inflation, but it has not otherwise made 
adjustments. Sunstein, supra note 54, at 2284. 
 74. See Dora L. Costa & Matthew E. Kahn, The Rising Price of Nonmarket Goods, 93 AM. 
ECON. REV. PAPERS & PROC. 227, 229 tbl.1 (2003) (suggesting a likely current value of $12 
million); Viscusi, supra note 16, at 252 tbl.5 (finding values as high as $15.1 million for white 
males). In the context of arsenic regulation, the EPA also noted in its sensitivity analysis that 
the appropriate adjustment would increase the VSL from $6.1 million to $6.7 million. National 
Primary Drinking Water Regulations; Arsenic and Clarifications to Compliance and New 
Source Contaminants Monitoring, 66 Fed. Reg. 6976, 7012 (Jan. 22, 2001) (codified at 40 C.F.R. 
pts. 9, 141, and 142). Recent evidence suggests that the current VSL is $4.7 million for the entire 
population, $7 million for blue-collar males, and $8.5 million for blue-collar females. Viscusi, 
supra note 55, at 39. 
 75. The availability heuristic suggests that people will overestimate risks when an event is 
readily “available” to people’s minds, and underestimate risks when no such event is available. 
Timur Kuran & Cass R. Sunstein, Availability Cascades and Risk Regulation, 51 STAN. L. REV. 
683, 685 (1999). Optimistic bias suggests that people will be excessively optimistic about risks 
that they themselves face. Cass R. Sunstein, Hazardous Heuristics, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 751, 772 
(2003).  
 76. See infra Part III.A.2.  
 77. See VISCUSI, supra note 9. 
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D. The Value of Statistical Risks, Not the Value of Statistical Lives 
Suppose that the relevant problems can be solved and that 
regulators can identify a number, call it $6 million, that really 
represents people’s valuations. It should be clear that even if this 
were so, it would be grossly misleading to offer the following 
suggestion: The value of a statistical life is $6 million. It would be 
much more accurate to say that for risks of 1/10,000, the median WTP 
in the relevant population is $600—or that for risks of 1/100,000, the 
median WTP is $60. If true, these statements would, on assumptions 
later explored, be extremely helpful for purposes of policy. But even 
at first glance, it is clear that these numbers need not be taken to 
support a VSL that is independent of probability.78 Suppose that 
people would be willing to pay $60 to reduce a risk of 1/100,000. From 
this it does not automatically follow that people would be willing to 
pay $6 to eliminate a risk of 1/1,000,000, or $6,000 to reduce a risk of 
1/1,000, or $60,000 to reduce a risk of 1/100. It is plausible to think 
that people’s WTP to reduce statistical risks is nonlinear.79 As the 
probability approaches 100 percent, people become willing to pay an 
amount for risk reduction that rises nonlinearly to 100 percent of 
their wealth; as the risk approaches zero, WTP nonlinearly 
approaches nothing. For a risk of 1/1,000,000, for example, many 
reasonable people would be unwilling to pay anything, treating that 
risk as inconsequential. 
Hence the claim that VSL is $6 million is merely a shorthand way 
of saying that people are willing to pay from $600 to $60 to eliminate 
risks of 1/10,000 to 1/100,000. Because this is the range for risks with 
which most agencies deal, the relevant data are highly informative. 
For current purposes, this point is the crucial one. 
II.  INDIVIDUATION 
My basic claim is that VSL will inevitably vary across both risks 
and persons. If people’s WTP is higher to avoid cancer risks than risks 
of unanticipated, sudden deaths, then the use of a VSL, drawn from 
studies of the latter risks, will provide insufficient protection of the 
exposed population. If people in different occupations are paid 
 
 78. See RICHARD POSNER, CATASTROPHE: RISK AND RESPONSE 166 (2004) (“[T]here is 
no reason to think that the relation between the risk of death and the perceived cost of the risk 
is linear.”).  
 79. Id.  
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different amounts to incur a risk, then use of a uniform VSL will not 
track actual behavior, which is what it is supposed to do.80 If wealthy 
people show a higher WTP than poor people, then a uniform WTP 
based on a population-wide median will ensure insufficient protection 
of wealthy people and excessive protection of poor people in a way 
that might well prove harmful to both groups.81 And if the use of WTP 
is justified on grounds of welfare and autonomy, then a more 
individuated approach is justified on those same grounds. 
This Part begins by considering differences among risks and then 
explores differences among persons. It explains and endorses the 
claim that in theory, full individuation, giving all people the risk 
reduction for which they are willing to pay, is required by the 
prevailing theory. From this point, it emphasizes the problem with full 
individuation, which is that it is not feasible. But an intermediate 
approach, moving in that direction, would make a great deal of sense. 
The Part concludes with a discussion of the implications for 
administrative law. 
A. Risks 
I have emphasized that the data that underlie the $6.1 million 
VSL used by the EPA come from risks of accidents in the 
workplace—and that even if these data could be generalized, they 
would not justify a probability-independent VSL. But there is a point 
of greater practical importance. A 1/100,000 risk of dying in a 
workplace accident might well produce a different WTP from a 
1/100,000 risk of dying of cancer from air pollution, which might in 
turn be different from a 1/100,000 risk of dying in an airplane as a 
result of a terrorist attack or a 1/100,000 risk of dying as a result of a 
defective snowmobile. The very theory that lies behind the 
government’s current use of VSL justifies a simple conclusion: VSL 
should be risk-specific; it should not be the same across statistically 
equivalent risks. The use of a single number almost certainly produces 
significant blunders and incorrect decisions about the appropriate 
amount of regulatory protection. 
1. Data. To test these issues in a highly preliminary way, I 
conducted a small contingent valuation study. Eighty-four University 
 
 80. Viscusi, supra note 55, at 33, 39–41. 
 81. On the “might well,” see infra Part III.B.  
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of Chicago law students were asked about their WTP to eliminate 
each of five risks of 1/100,000. The simplest of these risks involved 
dying from an automobile accident as a result of a defective brake. 
The four other risks might be expected to occasion greater concern; 
they involved deaths from lung cancer, AIDS, Alzheimer’s disease, 
and airplane crashes resulting from terrorist attacks. The 1/100,000 
risk of dying in an automobile accident produced a mean WTP of 
$156, whereas the four other accidents produced significantly higher 
values (ranging from $184 for the AIDS risk to $193 for Alzheimer’s 
disease). In addition, there was substantial heterogeneity across 
individuals. For each of the questions, about ten respondents were 
willing to pay nothing to eliminate the 1/100,000 risk, producing a 
VSL of zero. At the opposite end of the spectrum, about fifteen 
people were willing to pay at least $500 to eliminate each of the 
1/100,000 risks, producing a VSL of $50 million. This informal study 
suggests that even within a relatively homogenous group (law 
students), people do not treat statistically identical risks in the same 
way, and indeed there are differences across persons as well as across 
risks. 
With respect to the data on which agencies generally rely, notice 
initially that the very category of “workplace risks” conceals relevant 
differences. The American economy contains a wide range of 
occupations and industries, and a uniform VSL should not be 
expected to emerge from each of them. Indeed, a recent study finds 
significant differences across both occupations and industries,82 with 
blue-collar workers showing a higher VSL than others.83 It is 
inevitable that a wide range of values would emerge from studies 
looking separately at machine operators, executives, sales associates, 
dental technicians, equipment cleaners, security guards, and 
secretaries84—and diverse values undoubtedly could be found within 
each category. 
In addition, many risks controlled by the EPA are qualitatively 
different from the workplace risks that the EPA has used to generate 
its VSL. Two differences are particularly important. First, the 
workplace studies do not involve cancer, and cancer risks are often 
involved in environmental decisions. There is considerable evidence 
 
 82. Viscusi, supra note 55, at 39–41. 
 83. Id. 
 84. See id. at 33 (containing data clearly indicating that separate numbers for different 
occupation groups would emerge). 
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that the risks associated with cancer produce a higher WTP than 
other kinds of risk.85 For example, Professors Hammitt and Liu find 
that in Taiwan, WTP to eliminate a cancer risk is about one-third 
higher than WTP to avoid a risk of a similar, chronic degenerative 
disease.86 Some contingent valuation studies suggest that people are 
willing to pay twice as much to prevent a cancer death as an 
instantaneous death.87 People seem to have a special fear of cancer, 
and they seem to be willing to pay more to prevent a cancer death 
than a sudden, unanticipated death, or a death from heart disease.88 
The “cancer premium” might be produced by the “dread” nature of 
cancer; it seems well established that dreaded risks produce special 
social concern, holding the statistical risk constant.89 
To be sure, existing evidence on this count is not unambiguous. 
One study of occupational exposures does not find a significantly 
higher VSL for cancer risks.90 But that study assumes that 
occupational cancers account for 10 to 20 percent of all cancer 
deaths—an amount that is almost certainly too high. If occupational 
exposures account for 5 percent of all cancers—a far more realistic 
number—then the VSL for cancer risks may be as high as $12 million, 
about double the amount that the EPA now uses. The current 
findings conflict;91 but in principle, the VSL figures should be risk-
specific, and existing evidence generally supports the view that cancer 
risks produce an unusually high VSL. 
 
 85. Richard L. Revesz, Environmental Regulation, Cost-Benefit Analysis, and the 
Discounting of Human Lives, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 941, 972–74 (1999); Hammitt & Liu, supra 
note 11, at 74.  
 86. Id. at 84. 
 87. Id. at 81. 
 88. See George Tolley et al., State-of-the-Art Health Values, in VALUING HEALTH FOR 
POLICY 323, 339–40 (George Tolley et al. eds., 1994) (arguing that the value of avoiding a 
mortality risk preceded by morbidity includes the value of avoiding an instantaneous death plus 
the value of avoiding the preceding years afflicted with the particular condition). 
 89. See Revesz, supra note 85, at 972–74 (discussing “the dread aspects of carcinogenic 
deaths” and their impact on WTP studies). See generally PAUL SLOVIC, THE PERCEPTION OF 
RISK (2000) (exploring how risk perception affects individual behavior). 
 90. See Viscusi & Aldy, supra note 10, at 57 (finding that estimates of values for cancer 
mortality and accidental death were similar); see also Wesley A. Magat et al., A Reference 
Lottery Metric for Valuing Health, 42 MGMT. SCI. 1118, 1129 (1996) (finding no difference 
between valuations of cancer deaths and auto accident deaths). 
 91. See Viscusi & Aldy, supra note 10, at 57 (contrasting the United Kingdom Health and 
Safety Executive’s use of a higher VSL for cancer deaths with the recommendation of the 
EPA’s SAB not to make any “dread” modification to VSL for certain risks).  
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The second difference between workplace risks and the risks that 
concern the EPA is that the latter risks seem peculiarly involuntary 
and uncontrollable.92 Unlike the risks of workplace accidents, 
pollution risks are not assumed voluntarily in return for 
compensation.93 A great deal of literature suggests that involuntary, 
dread, uncontrollable, and potentially catastrophic risks produce 
unusually high levels of public concern.94 If so, the numbers that 
derive from workplace accidents will substantially understate WTP 
for regulatory benefits provided by the EPA and many other 
agencies.95 
The implications of risk-specific VSL go well beyond the 
distinction between workplace accidents and environmental risks. For 
example, people appear to be willing to pay far more to produce 
safety in the air than on the highways;96 it follows that VSL should be 
higher for the FAA than for the National Highway Traffic Safety 
Administration. Oddly, the former agency has an unusually low 
rather than an unusually high VSL.97 Some diseases would produce a 
higher VSL than others. A 1/100,000 risk of death from Alzheimer’s 
disease, for example, would almost certainly produce a higher VSL 
 
 92. See, e.g., ACKERMAN & HEINZERLING, supra note 9, at 147 (arguing that 
environmental risks are involuntary because they are “not allocated, even in theory, according 
to market transactions”); Sunstein, supra note 54, at 2285 (“The risk of cancer from drinking 
water is qualitatively different from the workplace risks that the EPA used to generate its VSL. 
The risks from drinking water seem peculiarly involuntary and uncontrollable, and a great deal 
of literature suggests that involuntary and uncontrollable risks produce individual concern.”).  
 93. Of course it is possible to question the idea that workplace risks are assumed 
voluntarily and in return for compensation. For example, many workers probably do not know 
the risks that they face. The distinction that I am drawing here is one of kind rather than degree. 
See Cass R. Sunstein, Bad Deaths, 14 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 259, 272 (1997) (proposing that 
low-wage workers involuntarily assume risks because they lack information). 
 94. See, e.g., Paul Slovic, Perception of Risk, 236 SCIENCE 280, 282–83 (1987). 
 95. See, e.g., Sunstein, supra note 54, at 2285 (“As compared to workplace risks, there can 
be little doubt that the risk of arsenic from drinking water is worse along the relevant 
dimensions. For this reason, it makes sense to think that people would be willing to pay a 
premium to avoid the risks associated with arsenic.”). See generally ACKERMAN & 
HEINZERLING, supra note 9. 
 96. See Carlsson et al., supra note 12, at 159 (finding that people’s WTP to reduce the risk 
of flying is double their WTP to reduce the risk of traveling by taxi, because the fear of flying 
produces particular mental suffering). 
 97. See supra Table 1 (listing the VSL for the FAA as $2.7 to $3 million depending on the 
regulation); OFFICE OF REGULATORY ANALYSIS AND EVALUATION, NAT’L HIGHWAY 
TRAFFIC SAFETY ADMIN., NPRM ON TIRE PRESSURE MONITORING SYSTEM FMVSS  
NO. 138, available at http://www.nhtsa.dot.gov/cars/rules/rulings/TPMS_FMVSS_No138/ 
index.html#Contents (Sept. 2004) (documenting the cost-benefit analysis of a safety regulation 
using a VSL range from $3.5 to $5.5 million). 
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than a 1/100,000 risk of death from a heart attack; a 1/50,000 risk of an 
AIDS death would not produce the same VSL as a 1/50,000 risk of 
death from a defective brake system on an automobile; most people 
would pay more to reduce a risk of dying from slow-acting strokes 
than from strokes that kill outright. There should be a distinctive, 
population-wide median VSL for mortality risks of airplane accidents, 
of cancer from air pollution, of motor vehicle accidents, of defective 
toys, of cancer from water pollution. 
In fact studies that have been done for seatbelt use, automobile 
safety, home fire detectors, and more find a wide variety of numbers, 
producing a VSL ranging from $770,000 (smoke detectors, based on 
data from the 1970s) to $9.9 million (fatality risks associated with 
safety belts and motorcycle helmets).98 And within each of these 
categories of risk, further distinctions would undoubtedly emerge. All 
cancer fatalities are not the same; informed people would surely 
make distinctions between those that involve long periods of suffering 
and those that do not. If agencies are really interested in basing VSL 
on WTP, then a uniform number, treating all statistically identical 
mortality risks as the same, is fatally obtuse. 
2. Practice. The claim that VSL should vary by the type of risk 
is not entirely foreign to current regulatory policy. In the context of 
arsenic regulation, for example, the EPA was alert to some such 
variations.99 Hence its own sensitivity analysis for arsenic suggested 
the need for an upward revision of 7 percent because of the 
involuntariness and uncontrollability of the risk.100 With this revision, 
along with the revision for income growth, VSL would rise from $6.1 
million to $7.2 million.101 In fact there are reasons to suggest that this 
amount might be far too low. Dean Revesz suggests that “the value of 
avoiding a death from an involuntary, carcinogenic risk should be 
 
 98. Viscusi & Aldy, supra note 10, at 25. 
 99. See National Primary Drinking Water Regulations; Arsenic and Clarifications to 
Compliance and New Source Contaminants Monitoring, 66 Fed. Reg. 6976, 7014 (Jan. 22, 2001) 
(codified at 40 C.F.R. pts. 9, 141, and 142) (demonstrating “the effects of incorporating a 7% 
increase for voluntariness and controllability,” based on a study indicating that “individuals may 
place a slightly higher [WTP] on risks where exposure is neither voluntary nor controllable by 
the individual”); see also Sunstein, supra note 54, at 2285 (arguing that the EPA’s “own 
sensitivity analysis suggests the need for an upwards revision of seven percent because of the 
involuntariness and uncontrollability of the risk”).  
 100. National Primary Drinking Water Regulations; Arsenic and Clarifications to 
Compliance and New Source Contaminants Monitoring, 66 Fed. Reg. at 7014. 
 101. Id. 
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estimated as four times as large as the value of avoiding an 
instantaneous workplace fatality.”102 Under this approach, the VSL, in 
the context of arsenic, jumps from $6.1 million to $24.3 million. I am 
not arguing that $24.3 million is the correct number; I am suggesting 
only that VSL, based on WTP, is almost certainly risk-specific. 
3. Qualifications. Three qualifications are important. First, 
psychological studies showing heightened public concern103 about 
particular risks may not translate into higher WTP. Social scientists 
might be able to show that certain qualitative factors make people 
especially concerned about certain risks, but it is an independent 
question whether and how much their WTP increases as a result. 
Fortunately, a number of studies of WTP at least suggest answers to 
that question, demonstrating that VSL should vary significantly 
across risk types.104 
Second, there is no simple or rigid distinction between the 
involuntary/uncontrollable and the voluntary/controllable.105 It is a 
mistake to believe that risks can be neatly separated into the two 
categories. Are the risks from air pollution in Los Angeles 
involuntarily incurred? The answer might seem to be affirmative, but 
people can choose whether to live in Los Angeles. Are the risks of 
airplane travel uncontrollable? Many people think so, but the 
decision to fly is itself under human control. Death from an asteroid 
seems to be a model case of involuntariness, at an opposite pole from 
hang gliding. But why? In deciding whether a risk is faced 
involuntarily or whether it is within personal control, the underlying 
issues seem to be whether those exposed to the risk are exposed 
knowingly and whether it is costly or otherwise difficult for people to 
avoid the risk.106 When risks are approached in these terms, it is clear 
that some risks are worse than others, even if the probability of harm 
 
 102. Revesz, supra note 85, at 982. 
 103. See SLOVIC, supra note 89, at 232–35 (discussing public concern about extremely 
minimal but highly publicized risks such as nuclear mishaps or genetic engineering). 
 104. For VSL calculations based on types of diseases and disease latency periods, see 
Hammitt & Liu, supra note 11, at 88. For a metanalysis, see generally Viscusi & Aldy, supra 
note 10. 
 105. Sunstein, supra note 54, at 2285; see Sunstein, supra note 93, at 272 (“[T]he question 
whether a risk is run voluntarily or not is often not a categorical one but instead a matter of 
degree, associated with information cost, risk-reduction cost, and the existence or not of 
accompanying benefits.”).  
 106. Sunstein, supra note 93, at 272. 
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is identical. This point is enough to suggest that VSL cannot be 
uniform across risks. 
Third, it is possible that extreme aversion to certain risks reflects 
a form of bounded rationality107—and it is doubtful whether that 
extreme aversion should be allowed to play a role in regulatory 
policy. Suppose, for example, that people really are willing to pay 
twice as much to avoid a cancer risk as to avoid a sudden, 
unanticipated death. Must these numbers be decisive for purposes of 
policy, assuming that the contingent valuation study is reliable? They 
might not be if there is reason to believe that the WTP figures are not 
accurately measuring welfare. And is it even plausible to think that 
the “cancer premium” is so high that it actually doubles the cost of 
death? Is it reasonable to think that a death from cancer is actually 
twice as bad as a death that is sudden and unanticipated? To be sure, 
a degree of pain and suffering typically accompanies cancer, and that 
fact illustrates the obtuseness of using the same number for cancer 
risks as for risks of sudden, unanticipated deaths. But it is not easy to 
defend the set of (exotic) values that would lead to the conclusion 
that the relevant pain and suffering is as bad as death itself. If WTP 
does not accurately measure welfare in the case of cancer, and if the 
inflated numbers for cancer deaths are a product of an intuitive recoil 
or terror at the idea of cancer, then regulators should not use the 
unrealistically high monetary values. 
For those who emphasize autonomy rather than welfare, perhaps 
this point does not amount to an objection to the use of WTP. If the 
goal is to respect people’s autonomy, regulators should defer to their 
judgments even if those judgments are mistaken. But if people show 
an especially high WTP because of a visceral reaction to cancer, or 
because of insufficiently thoughtful assessments of the stakes, then it 
is not clear that autonomy calls for following WTP. Government does 
not respect people’s autonomy if it follows their uninformed choices; 
this proposition raises doubts about government’s use of uninformed 
WTP. To be least controversial, WTP numbers would reflect 
informed rather than reflexive judgments about the nature of the 
harms involved. 
 
 107. See Sunstein, supra note 8, at 248 (“WTP will be a poor proxy for welfare in cases in 
which we have good reason to suppose that underestimation or overestimation is likely. Of 
course government officials should be reluctant to second-guess citizens, but in some cases, the 
second-guessing is well justified.”). 
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B. Persons 
Even when risks are identical, people are heterogeneous in their 
values and their preferences. The $6.1 million itself is the median 
figure—it is the median of a set of means. But everyone agrees that in 
workplaces and elsewhere, individual WTP is highly variable. Some 
of the variability stems from different degrees of aversion to different 
risks. Some people are especially concerned to avoid the dangers 
associated with pesticides, whereas others focus on the risks of air 
travel. Some of these differences are a product of beliefs about 
existing risk levels and others of tastes and values. So too, people with 
high levels of background risk should be expected to be willing to pay 
less to avoid an additional risk of 1/100,000 than those with low levels 
of background risk. If, for example, a relevant population faces thirty 
annual mortality risks of 1/10,000 or higher, it should be expected to 
show a lower VSL with respect to a new risk of 1/100,000 than a 
population whose background risks are less serious.108 The difference 
between the VSL of people in wealthy nations and that of people in 
poor nations, taken up in Part IV, is partly a product of the fact that 
the latter group generally faces far higher background risks. 
It is likely that WTP varies with respect to age as well. It is 
reasonable to predict that other things being equal, older people will 
show a lower WTP and hence a lower VSL, simply because they have 
fewer years left. One study, for example, finds that the VSL of a 
forty-eight-year-old is 10 percent lower than that of a thirty-six-year-
old; another finds that people under forty-five have a VSL twenty 
times higher than people over sixty-five.109 The most careful analysis 
suggests that VSL peaks around age thirty, stays constant for about a 
decade, but declines from that point, so much so that the VSL for a 
sixty-year-old is approximately half of that of a person between thirty 
and forty.110 These findings raise particular conundrums in the case of 
people under eighteen; how should government proceed if the VSL 
 
 108. See Louis R. Eeckhoudt & James K. Hammitt, Background Risks and the Value of a 
Statistical Life, 23 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 261, 264–65 (2001) (illustrating that VSL decreases 
as the aggregate risk of a population increases). 
 109. See Viscusi & Aldy, supra note 10, at 50–51. But see Sunstein, supra note 8, at 227 
(hypothesizing that older people may be willing to pay more than younger people to eliminate 
risk, giving older people a higher VSL). 
 110. See ALDY & VISCUSI, supra note 15, at 42 (calculating a VSL of $5.76 million for 
people between twenty-eight and thirty-two years of age, $4.83 million for people between 
thirty-eight and forty-two years of age, and $2.51 million for people between fifty-eight and 
sixty-two years of age). 
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for those between infancy and fifteen years of age is low, simply 
because they have little or no money? It is implausible to use a tiny 
VSL for them, but what number should be used, and why? Little 
progress has been made on this question,111 with the government using 
its ordinary, uniform number for children as for everyone else.112 But 
if the vexing case of valuing children is put to one side, then the 
prevailing theory suggests a lower VSL for those in the last stages of 
life than for those who have many decades to live—and this 
difference ought to be reflected in regulatory policy.113 
Along the same lines, many analysts suggest that regulatory 
policy should focus not on the value of statistical lives but on the 
value of statistical life-years (VSLY).114 Suppose that they are right. If 
so, then the statistical lives of young people are likely to be worth 
more than the statistical lives of older people. The government’s 
interest in focusing on VSLY led to widespread public objections to 
what, under one proposal, would seem to be a “senior death 
discount.” That discount would have valued someone over seventy as 
“worth” $.62 on the dollar.115 But assuming that people over seventy 
are willing to pay about 62 percent, on average, of what younger 
people are willing to pay, the theory that underlies current practice 
justifies exactly this disparity. If the theory is right (a question to 
which I will turn116), then a disparity between older people and 
younger people makes perfect sense to the extent that the WTP 
figures justify it. Note in particular that if each person has a 
presumptive right to a life of decent length, then the use of the life-
 
 111. For an overview that turns out to be highly tentative and indeterminate, see generally 
ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, CHILDREN’S HEALTH VALUATION HANDBOOK (2003). For discussion, 
see Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Dollars and Death, 72 U. CHI. L. REV. 537 (2005). 
 112. See ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, supra note 111, at 3–12 (“[T]here is not sufficient support 
in the economics literature for making adjustments to the existing estimates to account for the 
impact of age (including children). . . .” (citing ENVTL. PROT. AGENCY, GUIDELINES FOR 
PREPARING ECONOMIC ANALYSES (2000))).  
 113. See Sunstein, supra note 8, at 206–08 (arguing that agencies should use VSLY when 
analyzing the costs and benefits of a proposed regulation, to take into account that older people 
have fewer life-years remaining). 
 114. Id. at 206; see, e.g., Richard Zeckhauser & Donald Shepard, Where Now for Saving 
Lives?, 40 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 5, 11–15 (Autumn 1976) (measuring utility in terms of 
“quality-adjusted life years”). 
 115. See Sunstein, supra note 8, at 206–08 (discussing the EPA’s proposal to vary VSL based 
on age by setting the VSL for those under seventy at $3.7 million and the VSL for those seventy 
and older at $2.3 million).  
 116. See infra Part III. 
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years approach has a great deal of appeal, because it is likely to lead 
to special efforts to ensure that everyone enjoys that right. 
Even more fundamentally, those with little to spare will show a 
far lower VSL than those who have plenty. WTP depends on ability 
to pay, and when ability to pay is low, WTP will be low as well, 
holding preferences constant. For this reason the VSL of people with 
an annual income of $50,000 will be lower than that of people with an 
annual income of $150,000. People in the former category might be 
willing to pay no more than $25 to reduce a risk of 1/100,000, whereas 
people in the latter group might be willing to pay as much as $100. If 
so, government should not require everyone to pay $100; its decision 
to do so would harm those unwilling to pay that amount.117 A uniform 
VSL, of the sort that government now uses, threatens to 
“overprotect” the poor, in a way that might well be harmful to them. 
At the same time, the uniform VSL threatens to underprotect the 
wealthy, in a way that is highly likely to be harmful to them.118 
As a simple matter of fact, it would be expected that unionized 
workers would receive more compensation for incurring risks—and 
studies almost always show a higher VSL for unionized workers, with 
amounts as high as $12.3 million, $18.1 million, and even $44.2 
million.119 Large differences across nations would also be expected, 
with VSL being higher in rich countries than in poor ones. And in 
fact, studies find a VSL as low as $200,000 for Taiwan, $500,000 for 
South Korea, and $1.2 million for India—but $21.7 million for 
Canada and $19 million for Australia.120 Consider, for purposes of 
illustration, the following table:121 
 
 117. I am assuming adequate information and unbounded rationality. See infra text 
accompanying note 158.  
 118. Compare this with the EPA’s explicit and unexplained refusal to consider differences 
“in age, health status, socioeconomic status, gender or other characteristic of the adult 
population.” National Emission Standards for Hazardous Air Pollutants for 
Industrial/Commercial/Institutional Boilers and Process Heaters, 68 Fed. Reg. 1660, 1695 
(proposed Jan. 13, 2003) (to be codified at 40 C.F.R. pt. 63).  
 119. Viscusi & Aldy, supra note 10, at 45. 
 120. Id. at 27–28. 
 121. See id. 
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TABLE 3: VSL ACROSS NATIONS  
Nation and Year of Study VSL (in 2000 US$) 
Taiwan (1997) .2–.9 million 
South Korea (1993) .8 million 
India (1996/97) 1.2–1.5 million 
Hong Kong (1998) 1.7 million 
Canada (1989) 3.9–4.7 million 
Switzerland (2001) 6.3–8.6 million 
Japan (1991) 9.7 million 
Australia (1997) 11.3–19.1 million 
United Kingdom (2000) 19.9 million 
 
It would follow that within the United States, wealthy 
populations would show a higher VSL than poorer populations. If a 
program is designed to combat health risks in wealthy suburbs, the 
VSL should be above the population-wide median; if the protected 
population is mostly in poor areas, the VSL should be below this 
median. Currently agencies pay no attention to this possibility in 
undertaking cost-benefit analysis.122 
What about the more controversial categories of race and 
gender? Recent studies show significant differences. Using workplace 
data from 1996 to 1998, Professors Leeth and Ruser find that 
women’s VSL ranges from $8.1 million to $10.2 million, whereas 
men’s VSL is less than half that amount, ranging from $2.6 million to 
$4.7 million.123 Leeth and Ruser find that Hispanic males show a 
slightly higher VSL than white males ($5 million compared to $3.4 
million).124 Most strikingly, African Americans receive no 
compensation for workplace risks, producing a VSL of zero.125 Using 
workplace data from 1992 through 1997, Professor Viscusi also finds a 
significant disparity across racial lines, though his numbers are quite 
 
 122. See Adler & Posner, supra note 5, at 1136–39 (arguing that the failure to take into 
account the differences in marginal utility between wealthy and poor people distorts cost-
benefit analysis). 
 123. Leeth & Ruser, supra note 19, at 266. 
 124. Id. at 270. 
 125. See id. at 275 (concluding that fatal injury risk compensation for black males is negative 
but insignificant). 
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different from those found by Leeth and Ruser.126 In Viscusi’s study, 
the VSL is highest for white males and lowest for African-American 
males, with white and African-American females falling between the 
poles. More particularly, Viscusi finds that the overall white VSL is 
$15 million, whereas the overall African-American VSL is $7.2 
million.127 For white females, the overall VSL is $9.4 million, 
compared to $18.8 million for white males; for African-American 
females, the overall VSL is $6.9 million, compared to $5.9 million for 
African-American males.128 Another study by Viscusi finds a VSL of 
$7 million for blue-collar males and $8.5 million for blue-collar 
females.129 
What accounts for these differences? It should be expected that 
whites as a class will show a higher WTP and hence VSL than African 
Americans as a class. Simply because whites are wealthier, their WTP 
will be higher too. Might the same be expected within job categories? 
Perhaps the answer is yes, if past or present discrimination, or 
different starting points, produce racial disparities in compensation 
for risk within similar jobs. The precise causes and levels of the 
disparities are unclear, and the differences between Professors Leeth 
and Ruser on the one hand and Professor Viscusi on the other remain 
a puzzle. There is no a priori reason to think that men or women 
would show a higher VSL. If the relevant group of women is 
wealthier, then its WTP should be higher too. And if women are more 
averse to mortality risks than men, they will show a higher WTP, just 
because they will demand a higher premium. For my purposes, the 
central point is that demographic differences in VSL are entirely to 
be expected, and they are found in both studies. 
C. Theory and Practice 
If the foregoing points are put together, it is apparent that there 
is not one VSL, but an exceptionally large number of VSLs. In fact 
each of us has not one VSL but a number of them, targeted to each 
risk that each of us faces. A policy that truly tracked WTP, and based 
VSL on WTP, would seek to provide all people with the level of 
protection for which they are willing to pay to reduce each risk. 
 
 126. See Viscusi, supra note 16, at 252 (calculating fatality risk estimates and implicit VSL by 
race, sex, and income category). 
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. Viscusi, supra note 55, at 39. 
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Tracking WTP is the goal that underlies current practice; and apart 
from questions of administrability, it calls for a maximum level of 
individuation. 
1. A Thought Experiment. As a thought experiment, suppose 
that an all-knowing regulator could costlessly determine each 
person’s WTP for each statistical risk that he faces—and perfectly 
match the level of regulatory protection to that WTP. In these 
circumstances, the regulator should give all people no more and no 
less than their WTP for each risk that they face. (In cases in which 
people’s WTP was low because of poverty, they might be subsidized; 
but they would not be forced to purchase goods for an amount in 
excess of their WTP. I will return to this point,130 but subsidies are not 
my topic here.) Under this approach, regulatory benefits would be 
treated the same as every other commodity that is traded on markets, 
including safety itself. Of course most people face extremely serious 
problems in dealing with risk, stemming both from an absence of 
information and from bounded rationality.131 The all-knowing 
regulator would overcome these problems and provide people with 
what they would want if they did not suffer from them. 
If agencies could do this, then the current theory would be 
perfectly implemented. It would follow that with full individuation, 
overall WTP would be lower for poor people than for wealthy people, 
for African Americans than for whites, and (possibly) for men than 
for women. But, under this thought experiment, government would 
not discriminate against groups; for example, it would neither decide 
on high VSLs for programs predominantly benefiting whites nor 
decide on low VSLs for programs predominantly benefiting African 
Americans. The difference would be a product of aggregation of fully 
individual VSLs—aggregation of the kind that most conventional 
markets, including those for automobiles and consumer goods, now 
provide. Recall that the use of WTP is justified because of its 
connection with welfare and individual autonomy. If so, then fully 
individual VSLs are justified on those same grounds. 
 
 130. See infra text accompanying notes 148–49.  
 131. See David A. Strauss, Why Was Lochner Wrong?, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 373, 384 (2003). 
See generally Christine Jolls et al., A Behavioral Approach to Law and Economics, 50 STAN L 
REV. 1471, 1518–20 (1998) (arguing that despite adequate information consumers sometimes do 
not make well-informed choices because of their inability to process the information). 
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Of course there are two practical problems with taking the 
thought experiment seriously. The first is that agencies do not know 
the WTP of every individual, and as a practical matter, it is not 
possible to find out. The second problem is that regulatory benefits 
are often collective goods—goods that cannot feasibly be provided to 
one without also being provided to many. In the context of air 
pollution, for example, it is not possible to provide cleaner air for 
some without providing cleaner air for many or all. In regulating air 
pollution and water pollution, individuation is simply not an option. 
These problems are fatal objections to full individuation. But 
they are not fatal objections to more individuation. At a minimum, 
agencies should be encouraged to take account of existing research in 
their sensitivity analyses, which would result (for example) in 
increased “upper bound” estimates for cancer risks.132 In addition, 
disparities in VSL findings might be mapped onto different agency 
estimates, producing reasonable rather than arbitrary differences in 
VSL across agencies. If, for example, the risks of death from 
workplace accidents produce a lower number than the risks of death 
from consumer products, then the Occupational Safety and Health 
Administration should use a lower VSL than the Consumer Products 
Safety Commission. It is easy to imagine a research program in which 
the Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs would attempt to 
elicit far more information on VSL across different risks. A 
movement in this direction need not raise troubling ethical questions. 
It would be far more controversial to suggest that agencies 
should adopt different VSLs depending on whether the affected 
population is especially wealthy or especially poor. But at the very 
least, agencies should adjust VSL to changes in national wealth over 
time, producing a higher amount than would result from inflation 
adjustments alone.133 Or suppose, for example, that a regulation is 
designed to protect migrant farmworkers, expected to show a low 
VSL. Current studies in fact estimate the relationship between 
income and WTP,134 allowing agencies to make suitable adjustments 
to their VSLs. And when the population is relatively wealthy, the 
agency might adopt a higher VSL. For present purposes, I am 
 
 132. See supra note 74 (discussing the sensitivity analysis for cancer risks from arsenic). 
 133. Cf. Sunstein, supra note 54, at 2284–85 (discussing the rationale behind adjusting VSL 
for increases in national wealth).  
 134. See Viscusi & Aldy, supra note 10, at 36–43 (using a metanalysis of U.S. and 
international VSLs to determine the relationship between income and WTP). 
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suggesting only that an approach of this kind is indicated by the 
theory that government now uses. I turn in Part III to the larger 
questions that such an approach would make it necessary to answer. 
2. Optimal Individuation: An Intermediate Approach. The 
larger question is simple: What is the optimal level of individuation 
with respect to the value of life? The answer depends in part on how 
much is known. Even in markets, individuals are not usually asked, or 
charged, their particular WTP. In real estate markets, negotiation 
between individuals is the usual practice. But for ordinary consumer 
goods—cereal, soap, casebooks, subscriptions to law reviews—a 
standard price emerges from the forces of supply and demand. It 
seems clear that a uniform VSL, cutting across domains in which 
those forces almost certainly establish disparate amounts, fits poorly 
with the theory that currently underlies government practice. It is also 
clear that full individuation is not feasible. The appropriate approach 
depends on two familiar variables: the costs of decisions and the costs 
of errors. In the early years of cost-benefit analysis, a uniform number 
was probably the best that agencies could do. As better information 
emerges about different VSLs across risks and persons, the use of a 
uniform number will be increasingly difficult to support. If those 
differences are substantial, the argument for further differentiation 
will be strengthened. A uniform number might be seen as a plausible 
“first-generation” response to the problems posed by cost-benefit 
analysis. The second generation is now well underway, and hence 
finer distinctions will be increasingly hard to resist. 
3. Administrative Law. How would the use of more 
individuated VSLs bear on the legality of agency action? Courts have 
started to develop principles by which to review agency decisions 
about how to assess the costs and benefits of regulation.135 Some 
statutes explicitly require agencies to balance costs against benefits, 
and under such statutes an agency’s choices about valuation might be 
 
 135. The leading case is Corrosion Proof Fittings v. EPA, 947 F.2d 1201 (5th Cir. 1991). 
There, the Fifth Circuit explained: “[T]he proper course . . . is to consider each regulatory 
option, beginning with the least burdensome, and the costs and benefits of regulation under 
each option. . . . Without doing this it is impossible . . . to know that none of these alternatives 
was less burdensome than the ban . . . chosen by the agency.” Id. at 1217 (citation omitted); see 
also Am. Dental Ass’n v. Martin, 984 F.2d 823, 831 (7th Cir. 1993) (holding that the court’s role 
is not to evaluate the quality, necessity, or cost-benefit rationale of an agency regulation, but 
“merely to patrol the boundary of reasonableness”). 
